Leapfrogging in International Competition
In recent years the "new growth theory," which emphasizes the role of nonconvexities and external economies in the growth process, has increasingly focused on the interrelationship between trade and growthand in particular on the possibility of economic divergence between nations. The mechanism emphasized by such authors as Robert Lucas (1988) , Alwyn Young (1991), Paul Romer (1990) , and Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991) is essentially an updated version of the traditional idea of uneven development. Suppose that some sectors generate more endogenous technological progress than others, say through learning-by-doing. Then a country that has acquired a comparative advantage in such technologically progressive sectors for whatever reason, will tend to reinforce that advantage over time and thus to establish a growing lead over less lucky rivals.
In spite of recent claims that the process of international growth is typically marked by convergence rather than divergence, (see e.g., Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1991) it is easy to think of historical episodes in which a cumulative process of divergence does seem to have been at work; one need only think of England's growing industrial leadership in the early phases of the Industrial Revolution, or America's widening lead in the first half of the 20th century. Yet while individual countries have established long periods of economic and technological leadership, such periods of dominance are not forever. The early modern preeminence of the Dutch was ended by the rise of England; England's preeminence was ended by the rise of America and Germany; and we may be seeing the United States overtaken by Japan (see Table 1 ).
Such economic and technological "leapfrogging" could be essentially random: lagging countries may simply get lucky, and leading countries get unlucky. Historians have often suggested, however, that a more systematic process is at work, in which the very success of the leading country at one stage of economic development prevents it from taking the lead in the next.
Why should success breed failure? One might appeal to sociological factors; or one might, like Mancur Olson (1982) , suggest that a successful nation is bound to accumulate institutional rigidities that eventually cripple its economic performance. In this paper, we want to suggest a more narrowly economic explanation, based on a hypothesis about the nature of technological change.
We suggest that technological change is of two kinds. Most of the time technology proceeds incrementally, by gradual improvement of methods within a well-understood framework. This "normal" technical change is likely to proceed largely through learning-by-doing and will tend to occur most rapidly in those countries with established advantages in technologically progressive sectors. At intervals, however, there are major breakthroughs that change the nature of technology fundamentally. Such major breakthroughs require that nations start fresh.
When a new technology becomes available, however, it may not seem much better initially than the old one-and to a nation that has established a commanding lead in the old technology, it may well seem worse. Thus 18th-century Holland, with its established lead in shipping, banking, and trading, was not attracted by the prospects for cotton spinning; it was the somewhat poorer English who moved into the new area and exploited its eventually far greater potential.
Such paper is in six parts. In the first part we set out the basic assumptions of the model. In the second we describe the conditions of equilibrium at a point in time. In the third part we describe the model's dynamics during a period of "routine" technological progress, where productivity rises only because of learning within the bounds of a well-established technology, and show how such learning tends to "lock in" the role of the leading nation. In the fourth section we show how introducing a new technology, for which experience with the old is not very helpful, can lead to endogenous leapfrogging, in which the leader is passed by the erstwhile follower. The fifth part discusses the relationship between our model and the industrial-organization literature on leapfrogging among firms. A final section suggests some conclusions and possible extensions.
I. The Basic Model
We consider a world of two countries, Britain and the United States. There are two kinds of goods: a technically stagnant good (food) and a set of technically progressive manufactured goods. Labor is the only factor of production, and we assume that the two countries have equal labor forces L.
In the food sector we suppose that there are constant returns to scale, with the productivity of labor the same in both countries. Without loss of generality, we set the productivity of labor in food production equal to 1. Thus the outputs of food in Britain and America, respectively, are:
where LF and L* represent the employment in food production in the two countries.
Manufactures consists of a series of increasingly sophisticated generations of goods, which for simplicity we assume to be perfect substitutes. Production within each generation of the sequence is subject to external learning effects, which are specific to each country. This assumption of country-specificity of learning is crucial to the model and therefore needs some justification.
The essential argument for national specificity of learning is that much knowledge-and especially the kind of knowledge that arises from experience within a particular technological universe-is hard to codify and is transmitted largely through personal contact. One can hardly improve on Alfred Marshall's (1890 p. 271) description of the reasons why improvements in industry tend to occur best when those industries are geographically localized: "When an industry has thus chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there long: so great are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade get from near neighborhood to one another. The mysteries of the trade become no mystery; but are as it were in the air.... Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions and improvements in machinery, in processes and the general organization of the business have their merits promptly discussed: if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas."
Modern geographers, such as Allen J. Scott (1988) and Michael Storper (1992), have provided considerable evidence that innovative industries tend to thrive in geographically concentrated districts within which personal, face-to-face contact is routine. This is a theme that is central to the influential recent work of Michael E. Porter (1990) .
Indeed, such is the localization of technological innovation that we should arguably offer a model of regional or even urban rather than national leapfrogging. We intend to pursue this line in future work. In this paper, however, we treat countries as if they were natural untis, both for labor mobility and for information diffusion.
Returning to the model: we let Qi(t) be Britain's rate of output of the manufactured good of generation i at time t; then for the current output we have We assume A'> 0, A"< 0. That is, there are positive learning effects; but learning is subject to diminishing returns as each technological generation matures. The significance of this assumption will become apparent shortly. We choose units so as to make quantities of successive generations of manufactured goods comparable. Given this choice of units, each successive technological generation is better than the previous one; that is, Ai+1(Z)> Ai(Z) for any given Z. The new technology is only better, however, given sufficiently equal experience. A nation with extensive experience in an old technology may be more productive using that technology than it would be in the early stages of a new one.
We assume demand to be identically Cobb-Douglas in the two countries.
(7)
U= DAD'-A where DM is consumption of the manufactures aggregate and DF is consumption of food. We assume, for reasons that will be clear shortly, that the share ,tu of manufactures exceeds 0.5.
II. Short-Run Equilibrium
Except for occasional moments when one of the countries in our model is just in the process of passing the other, one of the two countries will have higher productivity in manufactures, while they have the same productivity in food. We will consider an initial situation in which Britain is the highproductivity nation, that is, where A1 > A*; but with a few changes the same equations apply when the countries' roles are reversed.
At any given point in time this model is simply a conventional two-good Ricardian model. In general, such models have three kinds of equilibrium: one in which both countries produce food and therefore receive equal wages; one in which both countries are specialized, and relative wages are determined by demand; and one in which both countries produce manufactures, with relative wages determined by relative productivity in manufactures. Our assumptions that ,t > 0.5 and that the two countries have the same labor force rule out the first kind of equilibrium and ensure that one country will always be specialized in manufactures. We will assume that Britain initially has a productivity advantage in manufacturing that exceeds ,u /(1 -,u). Thus the initial equilibrium is one of full specialization, in which Britain is specialized in manufactures, while America specializes in food.
III. Dynamics within a Technological Generation
Given the assumed initial pattern of specialization, Britain will steadily widen its productivity advantage over the United States. This will simply ratify, indeed lock in, that pattern of specialization. Since the entire British labor force L is devoted to manufactures production, we have
Al (20) = A' L. A1
Thus British productivity will rise over time, while American productivity will remain constant. Given the assumed shape of A(-), however, the rate of British productivity growth will decline over time.
Throughout this period, relative wages will be governed by (10); thus they will remain unchanged in spite of Britain's growing productivity advantage in manufactures. The growing productivity will instead be reflected in a corresponding decline in the relative price of manufactures. If this were the only form of technological change, this would be the full story. To get leapfrogging, we must add a second kind of change.
IV. Leapfrogging
We now suppose that a new technology, which we designate as technology 2, is introduced. As assumed above, the new technology is better than the old in the sense that, given the same amount of experience, it yields higher productivity. We assume, however, that for the British, who have extensive experience in the old technology but none in the new, the new technology is initially inferior. That is, at T2, the date at which the new technology is introduced, Since A* will be rising relative to A1, American food employment will steadily fall. As long as A1 /A* remains greater than 1, 6One might imagine that firms could have an incentive to adopt an initially higher-cost technology in the knowledge that this technology will eventually prove superior. This is not the case here because of our assumption that learning is wholly external to firms. Suppose that a firm expected all other firms to move to the new technology immediately; would the firm want to do the same? No: it would be more profitable to stay with the old technology as long as it remained lower cost, and then switch. However, since each firm will make the same calculation, nobody will adopt the new technology.
7A sufficient (though by no means necessary) condition is that each successive A(-) function approaches an asymptotic level of productivity that is surpassed by the next technological generation; in this case, the country that adopts the new technology is guaranteed eventually to overtake the leader. There is an extensive industrial-organization (10) literature on the conditions under which the technology of dominant firms tends to be overtaken by that of new entrants. This literature evidently bears on similar phenomena to those discussed here. The underlying mechanism is, however, quite different.
In the 10 literature there are usually assumed to be no externalities; firms are assumed to be able to establish full proprietary control over any new technologies they develop. Nonetheless, leapfrogging can still arise because of the so-called "replacement effect" (see Tirole, 1988 pp. 391-2). An established monopolist has a somewhat reduced incentive to innovate because he is earning rents from the old technology. Gilbert and Newberry (1982) showed that, in spite of this effect, an established monopolist in a world of complete certainty would still innovate ahead of potential rivals; but Reinganum (1983) There is evidently an incentive in our model for countries to pursue industrial policies; a well-informed government might increase national welfare by providing incentives for firms to adopt a new technology even when it is currently less productive than old methods. The competition between national industrial policies would then come to resemble the competition among firms in the JO literature. In this paper, however, we choose not to get into such questions.
We may also note that the JO literature is very much focused on partial equilibrium. Our subject forces a general-equilibrium treatment, and indeed general-equilibrium effects on wages and relative prices play central roles in the analysis.
VI. Conclusion
David Landes (1966 p. 563), echoing many other observers, has noted that "Prosperity and success are their own worst enemies." The usual explanation of the dynamic of " shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations" rests on noneconomic and socioeconomic factors. This paper suggests, however, that there may also be a simple economic explanation. In times of normal, incremental technological change, increasing returns to scale tend to accentuate economic leadership. However, at times of a new invention or a major technological breakthrough, economic leadership, since it also implies high wages, can deter the adoption of new ideas in the most advanced countries. A new technology may well seem initially inferior to older methods to those who have extensive experience with those older methods; yet that initially inferior technology may well have more potential for improvements and adaptation. When technological progress takes this form, economic leadership will tend to be the source of its own downfall.
Of course this need not happen. A number of conditions must hold if introduction of a new technology is to lead to a leapfrogging process: When these conditions hold, however, there will be a systematic process in which success breeds failure and vice versa.
In conclusion, we might also note that a leapfrogging mechanism of this kind may well apply in other contexts and at shorter time scales than the grand level of national competition described in this paper. In particular, we would argue that leapfrogging stories are highly relevant to regional and urban economies. At this level, high land rents and congestion as well as high wages in the leading region may create the opportunity for the follower to begin its surge. The principle remains the same: those who 
